Civil dating defense from material
It has also been held that “[b]ecause the Privacy Act provides its own remedy for an agency’s improper refusal to process a proper request for information, [a plaintiff] is not entitled to mandamus relief.” , No.
1993) (recognizing applicability of subsection (e)(3) to IRS summons, and possibility “that a summons may be judicially enforceable yet not meet the disclosure requirements of the Privacy Act”).
2012) (“To the extent [plaintiff] relies on the Privacy Act and believes the Privacy Act provides him a legal remedy, .
[plaintiff] cannot seek review in this Court under the APA.”); , No.
July 24, 2012) (finding court “lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim on the basis of 26 U.
§ 7852(e), which renders certain provisions of the Privacy Act inapplicable to the determination of the existence of tax-related liability”); , 842 F.
July 20, 2005) (reasoning that “[b]ecause there is an adequate remedy available to plaintiff under the Privacy Act, he cannot resort to the APA for relief”); , 773 F.
The District Court for the District of Columbia has analyzed the relationship between the Privacy Act and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”), Pub. The court concluded that because the procedures promulgated by the Department pursuant to HCQUIA “provide less protection than the procedures required by the Privacy Act,” it held that the Department “must adhere to the requirements of the Privacy Act when considering a dispute to a record in the” database established by HCQIA. The District Court for the District of Columbia has also analyzed the relationship between the Privacy Act and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 42 U. The court dismissed this claim on the ground that it “would be inconsistent with both HIPAA and the Privacy Act’s plain language” to “recognize under the Privacy Act a private right of action that Congress has expressly denied under HIPAA.” , 323 F.
30, 2007) (assuming jurisdiction over claims of invasion of privacy brought under FTCA and based on conduct held to violate Privacy Act, but determining that plaintiffs failed to prove the elements of those claims), , No. In the context of equitable relief under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. Indeed, under the APA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enjoined the Veterans Administration from disclosing medical records about an individual pursuant to a routine use that “would permit routine disclosure pursuant to a grand jury subpoena” as that would “circumvent the mandates of the Privacy Act.” , 851 F.2d 1457, 1466-67 (D. 1989) (discussing the extent to which First Amendment claim involves damages resulting from maintenance of records, “such an action is apt to be foreclosed by the existence of the Privacy Act”), to move forward because “the conduct here strays so far afield from the compass of the Privacy Act that it cannot be said that Congress ever contemplated the sort of claim here being covered by the statute[,]” because defendant’s “actions here did not involve the sort of collection of information contemplated by the Act, instead, his words were merely a threat to intimidate [plaintiff] from continuing in her speech, just as ‘I will arrest you if you continue to protest’ or ‘I will take a picture of you for my book of crazy protesters’ would deter a person from speaking”); claim, but relying on fact that plaintiff’s claims related in part to events predating effective date of Privacy Act and, more significantly, so holding without benefit of subsequent Supreme Court precedent bearing on issue); , but concluding that their logic does not extend to prohibit recovery under local law for torts committed by individuals who, although government employees, were acting outside scope of their employment; holding that “Privacy Act does not preempt the common law invasion of privacy tort”). §§ 701-706 (2006), for claims governed by the Privacy Act, the Supreme Court has recently stated that “[t]he Privacy Act says nothing about standards of proof governing equitable relief that may be open to victims of adverse determinations or effects, although it may be that this inattention is explained by the general provisions for equitable relief within the [APA].” in its Civil Remedies section that “[a]n individual may seek judicial review under other provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)”). 1988) (furthering the principle of “avoiding constitutional questions if at all possible” where the plaintiff did “not premise his claim for equitable relief on the APA,” but the court considered the claim under the APA rather than resolving the plaintiff’s constitutional claims) (discussed above under subsections (b)(3) and (b)(11)); , 947 F. 10, 1999) (holding Privacy Act notice requirements inapplicable to issuance of IRS summons, as 26 U.
§ 7852(e) “plainly states that the provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply, directly or indirectly, to assessing the possibility of a tax liability”); , No.
25, 2002) (holding that court had jurisdiction under APA to enjoin FBI from disclosing investigative records in order to prevent future violation of subsection (b) of Privacy Act); , 893 F.2d 370, 374 n.6 (D.